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SOME STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AND
APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL LAW
JAMES C. QUARLES*
Statutory construction and interpretation, important in every field of law,
is vital in a field containing a large number of legislative acts and a consider-
able body of appellate court decisions construing them. For this reason alone,
statutory construction problems are particularly significant in criminal law.
Many American jurisdictions punish no activity other than that expressly de-
clared criminal by statute.' The Federal Government, which of course punishes
no crimes except those defined by Congress, has contributed to this growth of
the criminal law through the imposition of many duties and the proscription of
various activities relating to the collection of revenue, national defense, regula-
tion of interstate and foreign commerce and the several other fields into which
Federal Government activity is continually expanding. Without the reinforce-
ment of statutory specifications, several states punish conduct which was pun-
ishable under common law principles. Even in these jurisdictions, the complex-
ities of our present civilization have required definition of additional conduct
the community feels departs from its presently accepted standards. The expan-
sion of state government, also, into fields not previously regulated, and the
emergence of many types of conduct unknown to the common law, have made
statutory crimes of the first importance.
Thus every jurisdiction has a large body of criminal law consisting of "shall"
and "shall not" commands emanating from the legislature. The language of
these legislatures usually lacks mathematical precision. This imprecision is in
part due to poor draftsmanship, but is primarily due to the innate frailties
of human language. Regardless of its cause, this lack of precision in criminal
statutes affords numerous opportunities for astute and zealous defense counsel
to discover or to create ambiguity in the meaning of a statute and then to urge
an interpretation that will place the conduct of his client in a less unfavorable
light. Courts and attorneys are therefore faced with a large array of precedents
on the construction of criminal statutes, and in typical obedience to the common
law rules of precedent, it is to these cases that the profession looks.
The second and most important cause for the controlling importance
of statutory construction in the field of criminal law is the meticulous care
with which courts consider legislative language when conviction or release
of the accused individual depends upon the interpretation the courts accept.
* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
1. 1 BtRwicx, LAW OF CRnguE 97 (1946); MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1074 (1940).
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Courts' reaction to criminal statutes is, with exceptions to be mentioned later,
largely based upon the traditional Anglo-American view that the individual
is to be treated fairly by the legislature and that it is the duty of the courts to ex-
amine legislative acts with the purpose of protecting the accused. This attitude
has found expression in the maxims nulla poena sine lege and nullem crinien
sine lege. The former expresses the view that criminal conduct is not to be met
with a sanction not specified anterior to the conduct; the latter, the view that
no activity is punishable unless the sovereign has so declared.2 These terms are
sometimes used interchangeably, and they do not differ in fundamental philos-
ophy.-'
Two principal postulates have grown out of the philosophy that an indi-
vidual's life and liberty are to be vigilantly safeguarded. One rule is that critn-
inal statutes are to be strictly construed; the other, that a statute which fails
to meet certain requirements for definiteness of standard is not a legal basis
for punishment. These approaches are often the same because they are rooted
in the same basic consideration and because the distinction between them is
primarily one of degree. Thus, the question in strict construction is whether
particular conduct falls within the scope of the statute. The problem of vague-
ness, on the other hand, presents this question and in addition the question
whether a court or individual ever can tell when conduct is or is not included
and therefore whether the statute should fall completely.
In applying these two rules, the courts ostensibly seek to effectuate the
collective will of the people as enunciated by their spokesmen in the legislature
and at the same time to make sure that the conduct of which an individual is
accused is actually contrary to the expressed will of the group. Since both
rules set limitations upon the legislature, it is to be expected that their applica-
tion will usually bring about results favorable to the defendant.
Although it is not always possible to predict accurately what result
will be reached by an application of the rule of strict construction of
criminal statutes, the rule itself can be simply stated and readily applied.
It is applied when a criminal statute may mean more than one thing, and one
meaning will condemn the defendant's conduct while the other will not in-
clude it. In such a case, the rule of strict construction requires the court to
reject the meaning which would declare defendant's conduct illegal.
The usual approach to any problem of statutory construction is to seek
the intention of the legislature, and this approach is also considered basic to
the construction of criminal statutes. Thus, many courts indicate that the
rule of strict construction is a part of the larger purpose of ascertaining legis-
lative intent, and that it is not the only means for determining that intent,
2. The principle of legality is fully considered in J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW c. 2 (1947).
3. HALL op. cit. supra, note 2 at 20. See also Note, The Use of Analogy in Crinisnal
Law, 47 COL. L. REv. 613 (1947).
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If courts were to approach criminal statutes with only the rule of strict con-
struction in mind, the restrictions put upon legislatures would undoubtedly
be more oppressive than they are now. But courts approach the problem with
the many other construction aids, and if the application of other principles of
statutory construction give ready answer to the question of whether the legis-
lature has made defendant's conduct punishable, the inquiry may be ended. The
evil sought to be corrected by the statute, the legislative history of the statute,
statutes in pari inateria, and all the other devices traditionally used by courts
may be and frequently are brought to bear on criminal statutes. Strict con-
struction, however, is often more than a mere hand tool, to be tried and tossed
aside if it fails to do the job at once. It is rather, a pervasive attitude which de-
termines finally, when ambiguity remains after resort to other rules, that the
legislature did not mean to punish the accused for engaging in the activity
in question.
The rule of strict construction of criminal statutes has a long history,
although its origins are not clear. The rule may have arisen almost as early
as the process of construction itself.4 Certainly a form of the doctrine may be
found in Roman law,5 but it probably reached its greatest usefulness in Eng-
land because of the desirability of mitigating the severity of the early criminal
law. 6
It has been suggested that the rule of strict construction of criminal statutes
is based upon the "tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals," 7
and the ripening of the rule to its fullest extent and most vigorous application
at a time when there was need to relax the rigor of criminal law is some indi-
cation that "tenderness" is its true source. This reason for strict construction,
however, seems inconsistent with the principle that the legislature, rather
than the courts, makes the law. It is of course the duty of the legislature to
define the crime and prescribe the punishment which may be imposed. The
fact that the court considers the penalty excessive when compared with the
court's ideas of the culpability of the conduct may simply mean that the legis-
lature took a more severe view of the conduct than the court does. Since
legislatures usually have investigative facilities superior to those of any court,
and are in closer touch with the current needs of the community, severe pun-
ishment of offenses probably means the legislature has reason to view that
conduct as especially dangerous. At the time of almost unbridled severity of
the criminal law of England, the strict construction of criminal laws was a pur-
poseful perversion and thwarting of legislative intenti6n-a result unjustified in
4. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37, 42 (U.S. 1820).
5. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES op CRIuIINAL LAW 21 (1947).
6. See L. Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HAR . L. REV.
748 (1935).
7. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37, 42 (U.S. 1820).
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days of laws enacted by an informed legislature whose members are in every
way representative of the governed.
The argument is sometimes advanced that strict construction of criminal
statutes is advisable because of the separation of powers among the branches
of government. This argument must assume that courts punish or legislate
when they construe statutes liberally or at least non-strictly and that the power
to punish is given to the legislature alone. The answer to this proposition is
obvious. It is the primary duty of the legislature rather than the judiciary to
make the law, but the courts often make law by confining or broadening the
principles of the common law. The function of the courts is primarily to con-
strue or interpret the laws, but this requirement does not mean that the courts
should construe or interpret the law in any particular manner. Separation of
powers is a doctrine which may militate against the validity of a statute when
the statute is so vague as actually to have no meaning. If a court should by
interpretation or construction give vitality to a meaningless combination of
words, it would undoubtedly be legislating and its action would be obnoxious
to general principles of government in this country. But when a statute is am-
biguous, interpretation is necessary. And if the court is "making law" when
it interprets the statute, it is making law regardless of whether its interpre-
tation is strict or liberal. To say that a court is legislating when it construes
a statute to include doubtful conduct seems to require the concession that a.
strict construction, by limiting the operation of the statute, repeals the statute
in part, and thus legislates just as fully as in the converse situation,
The most frequently stated reason for construing criminal statutes strictly
is to determine the intention of the legislature.8 Yet the entire question of leg-
islative intention is one fraught with difficulty. It has been contended that the
legislature actually has no intention that a court can ascertain. 9 The idea of
searching out the legislature's meaniig has become so well established, how-
ever, that it is likely to remain for long as the primary goal and guiding princi-
ple. Assuming, therefore, that there is a legislative intention, that it should
if possible be discovered, and that in most instances (when a statute is not
too vague, that is) it can be, the question is presented as to whether the rule
of strict construction leads to that end. If strict construction of criminal statutes
actually leads to a discovery of the legislative intention, it seems that it would
have to work somewhat like this: A statute clearly punishes a certain type
of conduct. The defendant engages in conduct which is similar to that de-
scribed plainly in the statute, but his activity is not unequivocally included
within the the scope of the legislative language. In other words, there is doubt
8. See, e.g., People v. Lund, 382 Ili. 213, 46 N.E.2d 929 (1943); State v. Mears, 213
Ind. 257, 12 N.E.2d 343 (1925).
9. For a discussion of different views regarding whether there is a legislative inten-
tion and how it can be discovered, see CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONsTRucTxoN § 163 (1940).
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as to whether the legislative intent was to punish this particular act. If there
is doubt, strict construction requires its resolution in defendant's favor, and
therefore, the court in effect says "the legislature may or may not have in-
tended to include this act; therefore, it did not intend to include it." The logic
of this approach when viewed as a device for determining legislative intention
thus is at best doubtful. The view imputes a tender and benevolent attitude
to the legislature when it was passing a statute designed to forbid certain con-
duct and impose sanctions upon those who engage in it. It might be more rea-
sonably argued that the intention of the legislature-its primary attitude and
purpose-was at least punitive and probably vindictive.
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the thesis that a strict
construction of criminal statutes effectuates the legislative intention is the
legislative reaction to this postulate. Apparently dissatisfied with the thwart-
ing of their actual intention by the application of this rule, many legislatures
have sought to mitigate its vigorous application or abrogate it entirely by
prescribing a different approach either in particular criminal statutes or in a
statute applicable to all criminal legislation. The reaction of courts to such
statutes has not been favorable-the typical court either ignoring the statute
or otherwise failing to carry out the legislature's purpose.'0 This situation
presents courts and legislatures as antagonists, and of course is directly con-
trary to the avowed purpose of the judiciary to ascertain the legislatures'
meaning.
The operation of the rule of strict construction can be best shown and
evaluated through a brief examination of a representative case in which
the premise was accepted without question and the rule was applied directly
and with as much logic as the rule itself permits. The question facing the
court in a recent Federal decision 1" was the guilt or innocence of a defendant
who had admittedly deposited for carriage in interstate commerce some
phonograph records upon which obscene matter was inscribed. The statute
under which the accused was prosecuted made it unlawful to deposit with
an express company for carriage in interstate commerce "any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other matter of indecent character." 12 The court reached
the conclusion that the statute was not broad enough to punish defendant's
activity. In arriving at this decision, the court made controlling use of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is of particular
application in construing criminal statutes because the doctrine-which re-
quires the meaning of general words following specific words to be limited
10. Statutes of this sort and the reactions of courts to them are considered in 3
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5607 (3d ed., Horack, 1943); L. Hall, Strict
or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 H~Av. L. RE,. 748 (1935).
11. Alpers v. United States, 175 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1949).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1948).
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to a meaning like that of the specific words-is essentially a rule of strict
construction. It necessarily restricts, never expands, the meaning of a statute
because it narrows the general words. The court came to the conclusion that
the salient characteristic of the articles specified in the statute was visual
representation, and decided that phonograph records were on the other hand
a means of auditory representation. Therefore, an obscene phonograph record
was not "matter of indecent character" as those words were used in the
statute. The argument that phonograph records were "prints" within the
meaning of the statute was also advanced by the Government. Notwith-
standing the fact that copies of the original recording were made from a
mold, the court rejected this contention on the theory that what is recorded
on phonograph records is understandable only after a process "so radically
different from that of imparting to the senses the meaning and contents
of prints ordinarily associated with the printing art that one cannot say
there is not a reasonable doubt that Congress intended to include them." I-
The result reached in this case is no better and no worse than the usual
outcome of construing a criminal statute strictly, and the result may well
be questioned. The first question is whether the statute was in need of
interpretation. Was it ambiguous? To a reader of the statute who was not
versed in the canons of construction, probably no question would arise, and
he would unhesitatingly say that the defendant's conduct not only ought
to be punished, but was clearly punishable under the statute involved. To
anyone familiar with the attitude of courts, however, any statute containing
a series of nouns followed by the phrase, "or other," a different approach
is indicated. Such a reader would at once be tempted to think of other
nouns and try to say whether they would or would not be included under the
"or other" clause. The answer to the question of ambiguity, therefore, seems
to be that the statute is not doubtful unless the reader has at his command
devices ostensibly devised and utilized for making clear the meaning of
statutory language. To anyone so possessed, the statute is ambiguous, for
it is not readily apparent to him whether "phonograph records" are "other
matter of indecent character." Assuming, then, that the unfortunate reader
has at his command aids for construing statutes and therefore is confused
as to the statute's meaning, the next question is, What does this general
language cover? The characteristics of the articles Congress obviously sought
to ban must then be determined. To the ordinary person, the statute seems
to be directed towards obscenity. There is more similarity between an
obscene book and an obscene phonograph record than there is between an
13. 175 F.2d at 139. [After this article had been prepared and submitted, the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in a 5-3 decision and affirmed the
judgment of the district court. 70 Sup. Ct. 352 (Feb. 6, 1950). The majority opinion used
reasoning similar to that expressed herein.]
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obscene book and a non-obscene book, if one has in mind the Congressional
intent. Yet the opinion considered the question of whether an obscene book
written in Braille would fall within the condemnation of the statute, and
indicated that it would not. By using general words following specific ones
in criminal statutes, the legislature probably meant to strike directly at
the wrongs it specifically made punishable and to include all other wrongs
basically and naturally considered the same, whether the other wrongs
existed at the time or whether new modes of committing the wrong were
developed by new practices or inventions. Courts in following this approach
would probably come closer to finding the legislature's actual intention, and
the approach has been adopted in resolving questions similar to those en-
countered in applying ejusdem generis. Thus, when confronted with the
question of whether use of a passport obtained by false statements to aid
the holder in returning to the United States was punishable under a statute
prohibiting "use" of a passport obtained by false statements, the court
decided the statute covered that act, even though passports were, at the
time the statute was passed, customarily used for convenience in traveling
abroad and not for returning to this country.14 "Old crimes may be com-
mitted under new conditions. Old laws apply to changed situations ...
While a statute speaks from its enactment, even a criminal statute embraces
everything which subsequently falls within its scope." 15
Contrasted to the restrictive interpretation of the obscene matter statute
is the liberal interpretation accorded the Mann Act. The latter forbids the
transportation in interstate commerce of "any woman or girl for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." 16 Here,
again, we have particular words, "prostitution" and "debauchery" followed
by general words-"any other immoral purpose." The problem then arises
as to what purposes other than prostitution or debauchery are within the
scope of the statute. One can readily agree with one of the Supreme Court's
early interpretations of this statute-that it covered transporting a woman
for the purpose of securing a mistress. -More recently, however, the Court
has construed the statute as covering transportation as a part of the practice
of polygamy. 7 The dissenting justices felt that polygamy is in the category
of marriage rather than prostitution and debauchery and under the ejusdent
generis doctrine should have been excluded from the statutory prohibition.
It seems that polygamy and prostitution have less in common than obscene
writings and obscene phonograph records, and if this is true, the rule of
strict construction has not been consistently applied. Despite arguments
14. Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 61 Sup. Ct. 599, 85 L. Ed. 862 (1941).
15. 312 U.S. at 339.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948).
17. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 Sup. Ct. 13, 91 L. Ed. 12 (1946).
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to the courts and almost unfailing dissents among members of them, the
Mann Act has received almost as broad interpretation as could be possible.
In regard to the Federal Kidnaping Act, Is also, the courts have dealt liber-
ally with the general term "or otherwise" following enumeration of "ransom'
and "reward," and have in effect said that benefit to the transporter is the
only requirement of purpose.19
Courts have often adopted the view that there should be a distinction
between criminal statutes in general and criminal statutes relating to par-
ticular subjects. It is said, for example, that statutes designed to protect
the public health are to be liberally construed, notwithstanding the fact that
they impose criminal sanctions. However much one may agree with the
results reached in particular cases in which this distinction is drawn, it
seems clear that it is a departure from the itullew crimen approach, and, if
strict construction is approved, a liberal construction of any criminal statutes
is to be criticized. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,2 0 however
beneficial its purpose and however great the need for such legislation, contains
provisions that are highly penal. It seems logical to say that all statutes
punishing injury to the person of another are designed for the protection
of public health. If this is so, no reason is immediately suggested for saying
that a rape, murder or aggravated assault statute should be construed on a
basis different from one punishing shipment in interstate commerce of
misbranded drugs. Yet under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act one is
forbidden to introduce into interstate commerce misbranded drugs, the
drugs being misbranded if the labeling is false, and labeling being printed
matter which accompanies the drug. This seems simple enough, but a
defendant can be convicted of violating these provisions if he sends the
drug at one time and the labeling more than a year later.21
Whether a strict or liberal interpretation should be given to criminal
statutes, it might be preferable to give the same sort of treatment to all
criminal statutes, rather than make differentiations upon the basis of the
purpose of the statute. All criminal statutes presumably are designed to
deter conduct the community feels is inimical to its interests. The value of
the interest sought to be protected should determine the seriousness of the
defendant's conduct and this seriousness should be 'indicated by the severity
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948).
19. Thus Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 Sup. Ct. 395, 80 L. Ed. 522 (1936),
held the statute violated by one who, for the purpose of avoiding arrest, kidnaped officers
and transported them across a state line.
20. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301 et scq. (1938).
21. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 69 Sup. Ct. 106 (1948). The intermediate
appellate court expressed its view of strict construction of the statute thus: "Appellant
contends that, since the current proceedings are criminal, he is entitled to a strict con-
struction of the Act, with proof of the violation, if any, beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts
for a long time have been committed to the doctrine of giving statutes intended to protect
the public health a very liberal construction." United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913, 917
(7th Cir. 1947).
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of the punishment annexed to its commission, on the theory that individuals
will be more strongly deterred as the penalty is increased. The breakdown
of crimes into felonies and misdemeanors, and the variations in degree of
punishment within those categories should provide sufficient distinction be-
tween the various unlawful acts. The relevant consideration in interpreting
all criminal, statutes should be whether a penalty is to be imposed, and not
the amount of penalty or the reason a particular activity is made criminal;
a six-month jail sentence may be more serious and greater punishment to one
man than a five-year sentence to another. Aside from informed sentencing
practices, no distinction can be made between individuals on this basis,
however. But the fact of criminality should not be determined by a court's
varying its, interpretation of statutes according to the nature of criminality
with the exception that more should be required of the legislature in defining
conduct punishable by imprisonment than in defining conduct punishable
by a fine.
The second important approach in the construction of criminal statutes
is that a statute must be sufficiently definite to serve as a guide.22 Like the
rule of strict construction, which is found in fields other than the construc-
tion of criminal statutes, indefiniteness may exist in statutes on any subject.
Because of the indlem crimen sine lege approach and the basic criminal law
attitudes thus expressed, however, the requirement of definiteness is more
relevant and more demanding in this field than elsewhere. 23 The purpose
of this requirement is to set a standard so that there will be a law to guide
individuals in their conduct and enable them to ascertain in advance whether
proposed conduct will deviate from the prescribed norm.
The requirement of definitenev.s duplicates to some extent the rule of
strict construction.24 Thus, in the famous McBoyle case,25 the court strictly
construed a statute prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of
stolen "motor vehicles," defined by the act as including "an automobile,
automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled
vehicle not designed for running on rails," and came to the conclusion that
the statute did not apply to an airplane. Following the ejusdem generis
approach, the court characterized the named objects as running vehicles
rather than flying vehicles, and thus presumably found and effectuated the
22. For a collection of cases considering indefiniteness of criminal statutes classified
according to subject matter, see Note, 83 L. Ed. 893 (1938). See also the excellent Note,
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HAxv. L. REv. 77 (1948).
23. "The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in
those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement." Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948).
24. See SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5605 (3d ed., Horack, 1943):
"The rule that penal statutes are strictly construed establishes a requirement of definite-
ness which must be met by the legislative draftsmen. Thus it is nbt uncommon to find
penal statutes declared void for indefiniteness."
25. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 Sup. Ct. 340, 75 L. Ed. 816 (1931).
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legislative intent. But the important reason advanced by the court was that
the legislature should give fair warning "in language that the common world
will understand, of what the' law intends to do if a certain line is passed." 20
Thus when a court examines a statute to see if it is.a sufficient conduct-
guide, it construes the statute strictly. This approach has the effect of
subordinating the intention of the legislature, and it admonishes the law-
making body to make clear to the individual what it expects of him. The
attitude, rarely expressed, seems to be that the court knows the legislature
intended to punish activity of the type defendant has engaged in, but raises
the question whether this language would have brought that meaning home
to the defendant. This appriach of indefiniteness of course does not
invalidate the entire statute. A defendant who knowingly transported a
stolen automobile in interstate commerce, or who sends obscene pictures
through its channels can of course be punished under the statutes considered
above-strict construction having, in such cases, only the effect of keeping
from the scope of the statute's operation those activties which are not ex-
pressly within it.
More drastic results follow when the operation of the statute is so
uncertain that it is impossible, or so a court believes, ever to tell whether
particular conduct offends the statute. Thus when a statute forbids one to
be a "gangster," and provides only that a gangster is one who is known to
be a member of any gang of two or more persons and who is not engaged
in any lawful occupation and who has been convicted of any crime or thrice
convicted of being a disorderly person, the entire provision falls.
2 7 It is of
course possible to determine whether an individual has been convicted of .1
crime or of a specified offense a certain number of times, and presumably it
is possible to determine whether one is engaged in a lawful occupation.
When one who satisfied these requirements becomes a member of a "gang"
is uncertain, however, since it is impossible to determine what a "gang" is.
In addition, it is impossible to determine whether one is "known to be
a member" of such an aggregation, since such questions as whether actual
or only putative membership is required, who must have the knowledge,
and what constitutes membership, cannot be ascertained. Here, the question
is one of degree, and the entire statute falls because the degree of departure
from certainty is so great. Of course most persons should determine that
they did not come within the statute's scope-everyone who has a lawful
occupation is excluded, and so are those who, regardless of occupation, have
not been convicted of a crime or of being disorderly three times. But the
impact of the statute is upon those who meet the plain requirements of
occupation and criminal record, and these persons, so the court felt, cannot
26. 283 U.S. at 27.
27. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 Sup. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939).
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tell whether they are violating the law. Thus no one can tell when the law
applies to the only persons to whom it can apply. The principle of legality
requires greater certainty; the statute falls.
The essential difference between strict construction and the problem of
indefiniteness is really the extent of definiteness. An ambiguous statute and
a vague statute are both indefinite. But as to the first, the statute is suffi-
ciently definite to condemn some conduct. Such a statute has clearly hit
some conduct, and the objects at which it may or may not have aimed (and
therefore, under the strict construction approach, did not hit) can have no
effect on the validity of the statute. An indefinite statute, however, has never
clearly outlawed any particular conduct. An apparent exception to this state-
ment is found in the examples of statutes which are so broad and indefinite
that they would punish acts which the legislature can and apparently did
mean to punish and also punish acts which the legislature cannot constitu-
tionally punish,28 or obviously did not intend to punish.29 The reasoning
leading to this result is the same, however, since a sufficiently definite
standard is not provided to the community at large when a statute covers
and by it terms prohibits two distinct kinds of activity. An honest citizen
is given a guide which is too restrictive by reason of being too broad, and
he could not tell, when measuring his conduct against the rule of the statute,
how his conduct would be characterized.
It may be well at this point to examine the reasons for the rule requiring
invalidation of statutes which are indefinite, for the reason determines
whether the statute must fall. The reason most commonly advanced is that
the individual must have sufficient warning.30 It has been suggested that
an additional purpose for requiring a criminal statute to be definite is to
permit the courts to apply the statute, the theory being that if the standard
is not definite enough to guide the court so that the judge may instruct the
jury and the jury determine the facts under those instructions, the statute
is, for a crucial purpose, meaningless. As a matter of strict logic this seems
to be true, but as a practical matter a statute apprising the individual can"
be made to apprise the court and jury. It does not seem likely that a court
28. Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242, 259, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066, (1937) ;
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 Sup. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R.
1484 (1931) ; State v. Tsutomu Ikeda, 61 Ariz. 41, 143 P.2d 880 (1943) ; State v. Men-
derson, 57 Ariz. 103, 111 P.2d 622 (1941) ; Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22
(1942).
29. State v. Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 202 Pac. 988, 991 (1921).
30. Probably the most frequently quoted statement of the rule is that contained in
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 Sup. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926) :
"That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of
fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."
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will be unable to make a determination the individual can make. Therefore,
the important function in the requirement of definiteness of a criminal statute
is to give notice to the individual. Even in those statutes which might be
vague to the world at large but are sufficiently definite to notify persons of
the group toward whom it is directed, the court may have itself and the jury
informed as to what the standard is, so long as the defendant has prior
notice.31 It is, of course, imperative that the judge and jury have a standard
sufficiently definite for application to given factual situations. But this
requirement simply means that, if such a standard is lacking, the defendant
may be punished just because the jury believes his conduct is blameworthy.
The requirement of adequate notice to the defendant is protection against
this sort of result because it advises the individual in advance of what con-
duct is punishable. Thus in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,32 the
court in declaring unconstitutional as too vague a statute on unreasonable
charges and excessive prices, referred to the "conflicting results" arrived
at by judges trying to apply the statute. The basic fault with the statute,
however, was not the uncertainty of the courts or juries as to what it meant,
but the fact that no one to whom the statute was directed could guard against
the imposition of its sanctions because he was not put on notice of the
conduct forbidden. If persons in that class could have decided, the court
could have. Therefore, if a statute is sufficiently definite for the individual to
inform himself as to the nature of his conduct, the court and jury can be
informed.
Requiring that a statute be sufficiently definite to put the defendant on
notice is to some extent, like the doctrine of strict construction, based upon
the tenderness the law has for the rights of individuals. Courts realize that
"it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals." 3 They require, however, that the text of
the law, if he had considered it, would have advised him that his proposed
conduct was forbidden. When a criminal is about to embark upon an enter-
prise he realizes is both morally wrong and in violation of statute, the fact
that he discovers later that he has violated another statute carrying substan-
tially the same punishment and of which he knew nothing should not for
that reason exempt him from punishment under the latter statute. The
same result should follow when he considers a statute but is unable to ascer-
tain whether his conduct will be in violation of it. If the defendant is a
wilful violator of the law, his knowledge of a particular law need not be
required. He has sufficient notice from other sources to be conscious of the
31. Thus experts can testify as to what the words "legitimate purposes" mean when
used in a criminal statute regulating sales of poisons by druggists ". . . so that the trial
court and jury may be informed as to what is recognized as a legitimate purpose for which
these drugs may be sold ...." Katzman v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 124, 130 S.W. 990, 993
(1910).
32. 255 U.S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045 (1921).
33. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 Sup. Ct. 340, 75 L. Ed. 816 (1931).
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nature of his enterprise. The criminal law should be designed to apprise
individuals of what they can legally do. It should not be the basis of a barter
proposition under which the individual may trade to society five or ten
years of his life (if he is apprehended and convicted) in return for the right
to commit larceny or assault.
There is, however, a sounder and more basic ground for requiring
criminal statutes to be definite, and that is to protect individuals from the
possibility of arbitrary exertion of the power to punish for a wrong of which
the individual could not be aware-i.e., for conduct which the individual
in good faith believes is proper.
There are two factors which may operate to save a statute otherwise
too indefinite. One is that terms of the common law will have their common law
meaning read into the words of the statute; the other is that if a statute is
directed toward a particular group or occupation, the meaning of the phrase-
ology to that class will govern and, if it is sufficiently definite to guide their
conduct, the statute will not fall for indefiniteness.
Thus, a statute declaring the grazing of sheep on "any range usually
occupied by any cattle grower" to be a misdemeanor successfully withstood
the challenge of being so indefinite as to violate due process. The court felt
the statute was directed to "men familiar with range conditions," and mem-
bers of this group who wanted to obey the law could easily determine what
was prohibited by it.34
The specification of common law terminology as an adequate guide raises
some question as to the soundness of the reason supporting the rule requir-
ing definiteness. As a practical matter, few laymen would be completely
warned of the nature of the prohibited conduct by relying solely upon com-
mon law terms. Yet terminology in this form is sufficiently specific even in
those jurisdictions having no common law of crimes. The practical results
of this phase of the question are logical, however. An individual should no
more be excused from complying with a statute on the ground that it
furnished him no adequate notice because the language employed common
law terms of art than he should be on the ground that the statutory compila-
tion was unavailable or inadequately indexed. To allow such lack of
information on the part of a defendant to defeat the operation of the statute
as to him would be equivalent to abandoning the principle that ignorance of
the law is not an excuse. The crucial question is whether the defendant could
have determined that the statute banned his proposed activity. And in answer-
ing this question, regard must be had for the resources he can be expected
to have at his disposal. If he is doubtful as to his actions and his attorney
cannot tell that the statute closest to his activity means to forbid it, then
the statute should be said to be too indefinite to serve its primary purpose
and should therefore be inoperative.
34. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 Sup. Ct. 323, 62 L. Ed. 763 (1918).
